Abstract. A distributed ledger is a tamperproof sequence of data that can be read and augmented by everyone. Distributed ledgers stand to revolutionize the way a democratic society operates. They secure all kinds of traditional transactions –such as payments, asset transfers, titling– in the exact order in which they occur; and enable totally new transactions ---such as cryptocurrencies and smart contracts. They can remove intermediaries and usher in a new paradigm for trust. As currently implemented, however, distributed ledgers cannot achieve their enormous potential.
Algorand is a quite alternative, truly democratic, and very efficient way to implement a distributed ledger. Unlike prior implementations based on proof of work, it requires a negligible amount of computation, and generates a transaction history that will not “fork” with overwhelmingly high probability.
Biography. Silvio Micali has received his Laurea in Mathematics from the University of Rome, and his PhD in Computer Science from the University of California at Berkeley. Since 1983 he has been on the faculty of the Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Department at MIT.
Silvio’s research interests are cryptography, zero knowledge, pseudo-random generation, secure protocols, mechanism design, and distributed ledgers.
Silvio is the recipient of the Turing Award (in computer science), the Gödel Prize (in theoretical computer science), and the RSA prize (in cryptography). He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Abstract. The Internet is expanding into the physical world, connecting billions of devices. In this Internet of Things, two contradictory trends are appearing. On the one hand, the cost of security breaches is increasing as we place more responsibilities on the devices that surround us. On the other hand, wireless computing elements are becoming small, unsupervised, and physically exposed. Unfortunately, existing systems do not address many new attacks, such as resource sharing and physical attacks.
Hardware to the rescue! This talk will describe how secure systems can be built from the ground up. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a tamper resistant way of establishing shared secrets with a physical device. They rely on the inevitable manufacturing variations between devices to produce private keys that can be used as a hardware root of trust in a secure processor. Architectural isolation can be used to secure computation on a remote secure processor with a private key where the privileged software is potentially malicious as recently deployed by Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX). The Sanctum secure processor architecture offers the same promise as SGX, namely strong provable isolation of software modules running concurrently and sharing resources, but is much more lightweight and protects against an important class of additional software attacks that infer private information by exploiting resource sharing.
Biography. Srini Devadas is the Webster Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) where he has been on the faculty since 1988. Devadas's research interests span Computer-Aided Design (CAD), computer security and computer architecture. He is a Fellow of the IEEE and ACM. He has received the 2014 IEEE Computer Society Technical Achievement award, the 2015 ACM/IEEE Richard Newton technical impact award, and the 2017 IEEE Wallace McDowell award for his research. Devadas is a MacVicar Faculty Fellow and an Everett Moore Baker teaching award recipient, considered MIT's two highest undergraduate teaching honors.
ACM WiSec 2017
10th ACM Conference on Security
and Privacy in Wireless and
July 18 - 20, 2017